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Abstract
Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts. Normative
economic theory, which began with writings by Beccaria and Bentham, aims to
recommend an ideal criminal punishment scheme. Positive economic theory, which
appeared later in writings by Holmes and Posner, aims to justify and to better understand
the criminal law rules that exist. Since the purpose of criminal law is to deter socially
undesirable conduct, economic theory, which emphasizes incentives, would appear to be
an important perspective from which to examine criminal law.
Positive economic theory, applied to substantive criminal law, seeks to explain and to
justify criminal law doctrine in economic terms – that is, in terms that emphasize the
incentive effects created by the law. The positive economic theory of criminal law
literature can be divided into three phases: classical deterrence theory, neoclassical
deterrence, and modern synthesis. The modern synthesis provides a rationale for
fundamental criminal law doctrines, and also more puzzling portions of the law such as
the doctrines of intent and necessity. Positive economic theory also provides a rationale
for the allocation of enforcement responsibilities.
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Introduction

Criminal law consists of substantive and procedural parts. Substantive law consists of the
rules that govern and control behavior – specifically the rules enjoining types of conduct,
such as robbery, that violate the criminal law. Procedural law consists of the rules that
establish the methods by which the state enforces criminal law, such as constraints on
prosecutorial behavior, and rules governing the burdens and standards of proof. 1
Substantive rules mostly constrain the conduct of private individuals. Procedural rules,
by contrast, tend to regulate the conduct of agencies and institutions in the criminal law
enforcement process. This essay focuses on substantive criminal law.
Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts. Normative
economic theory attempts to prescribe optimal rules for regulating socially undesirable
conduct. Positive economic theory seeks to provide a rationale for existing criminal law
doctrines and institutional features of the criminal law enforcement process. This essay
emphasizes positive economic theory. However, much of the literature has advanced
through analyses that are in part normative and in part positive.
The literature on the economics of criminal law is vast. This essay does not attempt to
cover every detail, and instead focuses on the broad framework of progress in the
literature. It provides an overview of the major arguments.
One of the great issues here, as in any other area of law and economics, is ensuring that
economic analysis addresses questions that are of central concern to the law. The
assessment of criminal intent, for example, is an important concern of criminal law, and
yet economics still treats this as a subject too unwieldly to capture in models. In
recognition of this tendency in economic analysis to avoid some matters at the heart of
the law, this essay attempts to integrate economic analysis with major criminal law
doctrines. 2
This essay provides a review of the economics of substantive criminal law. It divides the
literature into three phases: classical deterrence theory, neoclassical deterrence, and
modern synthesis. The modern synthesis offers a positive account of fundamental
doctrines (e.g., common law crimes), and also rationale for more puzzling doctrines such
as intent and necessity in criminal law. The essay closes with some observations, again in
the vein of positive economic analysis, on the allocation of enforcement responsibility.

Substantive Criminal Law

1

On the economics of criminal procedure, see, e.g., Posner (1973), Easterbrook (1983), Adelstein (1981),
Miceli (1991).
2
For a discussion of criminal law and economics that addresses these issues and behavioral economics as
well, see Harel (2012).
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The economics of substantive criminal law is largely contained in two models, one due
(mostly) to Bentham (1781) and other due to Becker (1968). Bentham asserted that the
purpose of criminal punishment is to completely deter offensive conduct. To completely
deter, the state should set the criminal penalty at a level that eliminates the prospect of
gain to the offender. Bentham was not the first to offer this commonsense proposition;
Beccaria (1764) proposed it before him. However, Bentham explored the deterrence
principle in greater depth than authors who came before him.
The notion that punishment should take the profit out of crime sounds like common
sense, but it also leads to recommendations that fall outside of common practice.
Bentham followed his theory to its logical conclusions on punishment, which led him to
recommendations that would be condemned in modern society as cruel and extreme. 3

Classical Deterrence Theory

Bentham’s classical deterrence theory suggests that the expected penalty must be at least
as large as the gain the offender gets from committing the offense. 4 The expected penalty
is simply the probability of punishment multiplied by the penalty. Thus, if the expected
penalty must be no less than the gain to the offender, in order to completely deter, then
the expected penalty and the offender gain must have the relationship: Gain ≤
Probability×Penalty. This implies, in turn, that the penalty must be at least as great as the
offender’s gain divided by the probability of punishment.
If the punishment is not imposed until some period after the crime has been committed,
then the offender’s discounting over time must be incorporated into the punishment
calculus to maintain deterrence. Let the offender’s discount rate, δ, be defined as the rate
that determines the subjective value today of a dollar to be received next year as
$1/(1+δ). If the punishment will not be imposed until n years after the crime is
committed, the penalty must satisfy the condition: Penalty ≥ (1+δ)n (Gain/Probability).
This suggests that classical deterrence requires multiplying the gain of the criminal by a
multiplier based on the criminal’s discount rate, the delay period, and the probability of
punishment:
3

For a discussion, see Hylton (2005, at 98). On the social acceptance of harsh punishment, see Schkade et
al. (2000).
4
I have set aside the issue of marginal deterrence, that is, the concern that penalties should be bounded
from above to ensure that the offender does not have an incentive to engage in more harmful conduct. The
marginal deterrence problem was noted by Bentham (781). For modern discussions, see Stigler (1970),
Mookherjee and Png (1994). I have also set aside other reasons why it may be optimal to have an upper
limit on the penalty. One (see Andreoni, 1991) is that a high penalty may reduce the probability of
conviction. Another (see Hylton, 1996) is that a high penalty may induce victims to take too little
precaution. For an exploration of implications of victim precaution see Rappaport (2018).

2
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Classical Deterrence Multiplier ≥

(1 + δ )

n

Probability

Probabilities of punishment are not readily available. One study notes that less than half
of violent crimes are reported to police and less than half of those reported are cleared by
police, suggesting a maximum probability of punishment of 25 percent for violent
crimes. 5 For property crimes, the rates are roughly one-third and one-fifth respectively,
suggesting an upper bound of 7 percent. 6 A study of punishment for environmental
crimes suggests that for such crimes the likelihood of punishment is extremely low, on
the order of 8 in one million. 7
As for delay, the average time between sentencing and the death penalty is running at 15
years. 8 Of course, this statistic is incomplete even as a sample measure of the delay
between the commission and punishment of a crime. A murderer, unless released on bail,
will have been incarcerated for the period of trial and throughout the period up to the
imposition of the death penalty. If any time in confinement, however short, is treated as
punishment, then the imposition of punishment occurs at the moment of apprehension.
However, it is unlikely that a murderer would view a small period of time in jail or prison
as consummation of the punishment. Moreover, there is quite a difference between
imposition of confinement and imposition of the death penalty.
To simplify matters, suppose there is no death penalty, and the offender is sentenced to
twenty years in prison. When, precisely, is the punishment imposed? The answer is that
the punishment is imposed over the entire time-span of the sentence. The penalty is the
discounted value of the disutility of the twenty-year sentence. 9 Thus, even in a case
where there is no delay before the initiation of punishment, a punishment such as
incarceration involves some feature of delay in imposition.
Obviously, it simplifies matters a bit too much to treat delay as simply a matter of the
time between commission of the crime and imposition of the punishment. The
punishment itself may not be instantaneous. Another problem is that the punishment may
come in qualitatively different forms, as in the case of incarceration followed by the
death penalty.

5

German Lopez, The Great Majority of Violent Crime in America goes Unsolved, VOX (Mar. 1, 2017,
3:10pm), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/1/14777612/trump-crime-certainty-severity.
6
Id. See also, Shavell at 1232 (noting that violent crimes and theft in the U.S. often go unreported (26
percent of home thefts and 67 percent of vehicle thefts), and therefore statistical percentages in crime
reports must be taken as “upper bounds for the probability of imposition of sanctions.”)
7
Lynch et al. (2016).
8
Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row
9
Polinsky and Shavell (1999).
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As far as the time-period between apprehension and sentencing, one study reports that the
median number of days between arrest and disposition (for all crimes) of the trial is 126
in the U.S., with another 52 days between disposition and sentencing. 10 In some
jurisdictions, the median delay between arrest and sentencing is over one year. 11
Most criminal defendants have low levels of education, 12 low impulse control, 13 and a
tendency to discount the future heavily. 14 McAdams and Ulen (2009) survey the
literature on the imperfect rationality of offenders. In effect, the typical criminal has a
high discount rate on future utility. The combination of high discount rates coupled with
delay suggests that criminal penalties should be enhanced to take these factors into
account. 15
Table 1 below computes complete deterrence penalties for different discount factors and
punishment probabilities, on the assumption that the offender’s gain is $100, and that the
delay between commission and punishment is only one year. For the realistic cases of
both a low probability of apprehension and high discount factor, this quite preliminary
analysis suggests that multipliers that raise the penalty by an order of magnitude are
plausible.

Offender Gain = $100 Punishment Probability (P)
Discount Rate (δ)

P = .5

P = .2

P = .1

δ = .09

$218

$545

$1090

δ = .18

$236

$590

$1180

δ = .30

$260

$650

$1300

Table 1: Classical Deterrence Penalties for Offender Gain of $100.

Since imprisonment is a common form of punishment, the existence of substantial
discount factors implies the deterrent value of prison may be less than appears to the eye
at first glance. If criminal offenders discount the future heavily, then a doubling of a ten-

10

Listokin (2007, at 139).
Id.
12
Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, (Mar.
15, 2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf (finding 68 percent of state prison inmates report
having less than a high school education.)
13
Nagin and Pogarsky (2004). On rationality and impulse control, see Cooter (1991).
14
Nagin and Pogarsky (2004).
15
Listokin, (2007).
11
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year prison sentence may not have a significant deterrent effect. 16 To increase the
deterrent effect of incarceration, the state would have to consider increasing the severity
of incarceration in the earlier portion of the period rather than extending the period of
incarceration. Heavy discounting implies a policy favoring the frontloading of
punishment. Such implications probably led Bentham to support extreme forms of
punishment, under a policy in which the punishment would be characteristic of the
crime. 17 Bentham’s ideal punishments would associate a severe loss with either the
perceived gain or the physical mechanism immediately associated with commission of
the crime. Thus, the thief would likely suffer amputation, and the rapist castration, under
Bentham’s punishment scheme. 18
In the extreme case where the offender discounts the future so heavily that a backloaded
punishment, such as a prison sentence, cannot deter his conduct, should the state simply
give up on the notion of punishment? Even if the offender cannot be deterred by such a
punishment, there is still an incapacitation basis for imprisonment. Once an offender has
committed an offense punishable by some definable penalty, he has revealed that the gain
he perceives from commission of the offense is greater than the expected penalty. Such
an offender is therefore likely to commit the offense again, unless incapacitated. Hence,
the observation that some criminals are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of prison is
often inadequate as an argument against imprisonment or other forms of incapacitation.
Yet another problem for classical deterrence theory was suggested by an interesting
thought experiment of Immanuel Kant (1797). Kant asked what society should do in its
last moments, before being dissolved, with the remaining murderers in prison? His
answer was that the state should execute them on that last day, lest society share in the
guilt for their crimes. If deterrence were the sole basis for punishment, there would be no
justification for punishment on the final day in Kant’s thought experiment. Indeed, if the
final day of society occurs on a certain date, the case for punishment for deterrence
purposes unravels. The day before the final day, punishment would not be justifiable
because every rational actor knows that the prospect of deterrence thereby gained is not
credible, and on the day before the day before, the same expectation holds, ad infinitum.
Hence, classical deterrence theory implodes.
But this reasoning is unpersuasive, on many grounds. First, it is inconsistent with the
ample empirical evidence of discounting and impulsiveness on the part of criminals. 19
The infinite-regression disproof of classical deterrence assumes hyper-rationality on the
part of actors, and the existence of a certain and foreseeable final date for society. None
of this is true of the real world.

16

This is an implication of discounting, see Polinsky and Shavell (1999).
See, e.g., Hylton, 2005a, at 98
18
Id.
19
Nagin and Pogarsky (2004).
17

5
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Neoclassical Deterrence Theory

Becker’s neoclassical deterrence theory holds that the goal of punishment should be to
internalize the social harm from a criminal offense. Internalization maximizes social
welfare by guaranteeing that a criminal offender takes an offensive action only when the
gain he experiences is greater than the harm he imposes on society.
Under Becker’s theory, the expected value of the penalty should be equal to the harm
imposed on society by the offender (Probability×Penalty = Harm), 20 which implies that
the optimal penalty is the social harm divided by the probability of punishment. If the
penalty will not be imposed until one year after the crime is committed (or planned) then
in order to achieve optimal deterrence the penalty must equal (1+ δ)Harm/Probability.
The internalization policy is preferable to complete deterrence if the activity of offenders
is potentially efficient, in the sense some instances the offender’s conduct actually
increases society’s welfare. If no instances exist where the offender’s gain is greater than
the social harm, then Becker’s framework would imply complete deterrence. In other
words, Becker’s framework incorporates the complete deterrence policy as a special case.
It should be clear that the foregoing statements concerning the relationship between delay
and the penalty multiplier apply just as well to the neoclassical policy. However, there is
a crucial difference. In the complete deterrence framework, the penalty multiplier
represents a lower bound on punishment. In the internalization model, by contrast, the
penalty multiplier must be precise; if it is too low, then the penalty under-internalizes,
leading to too many offenses. Conversely, if the multiplier is too high, then it overinternalizes, leading to too few offenses.
The implication that there could be such a thing as “too little crime” is a soft spot in
Becker’s model. How, some scholars have asked, could there be too little fraud, robbery,
or murder? 21 One answer, implied by the Becker model, is no, there could not be too little
murder. The state should completely deter murder because the gain to the murderer is less
than the loss to society. But this answer only pushes the question ahead slightly. What
should society do about cases where the gain to the murderer is greater than the loss to
society?

Modern Synthesis

20

This may seem to assume that the harm will be imposed with probability one. However, the harm
component can be interpreted as expected harm without requiring any changes in the discussion.
21
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d. 841, 847 (Easterbrook, J., “[t]he optimal amount of fraud is zero.”).

6
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The answer to this question was not suggested until Calabresi and Melamed (1972)
offered an alternative to the Becker model’s reconciliation of the complete deterrence and
internalization policies. Calabresi and Melamed did not frame their article as an
exploration of criminal law; it is mostly a discussion of civil law. However, in later
passages and footnotes, the authors sketch some of the implications of their analysis for
criminal law. Recognizing that Calabresi and Melamed had not fully explained the
implications of their analysis for criminal law, Posner (1985) extended the CalabresiMelamed framework to offer a positive theory of criminal law. 22
Calabresi and Melamed created two categories for legal rules: property rules and liability
rules. Property rules prohibit specified conduct. Liability rules do not prohibit conduct,
and only require the offender to pay damages to the victim (or a fine to the state).
Property rules implement the complete deterrence policy, while liability rules internalize
social harm. Calabresi and Melamed argued that property rules are preferable where
transaction costs are low or where (consistent with Becker) the underlying activity is
unambiguously socially undesirable because the gain to offenders could not exceed the
social harm. Property rules are therefore of two types: (Type 1) some aim to prevent
offenders from bypassing the market where transaction costs are low, and others (Type 2)
aim to eradicate socially undesirable activities where transaction costs are high.
Posner (1985), building on the Calabresi-Melamed framework, explains that much of
criminal law consists of Type 1 property rules. A robbery, for example, is a forced
transaction (“market bypass”) that could otherwise occur through the market. Even if the
robber’s utility from the transaction exceeds the loss to his victim, society has an interest
in encouraging such transactions to occur consensually through the market, rather than
through force or fraud. 23
Hylton (2005) presents a model that formalizes Posner’s argument and reconciles the
Becker and Posner approaches to criminal law. 24 The model generates the Becker and
Posner approaches as special cases. As a general matter, wherever the cost of transacting
through the market is less than the incremental cost of law enforcement, society should
encourage transacting through the market, by adopting the complete deterrence policy.
Second, even if transaction costs are high, complete deterrence is the optimal policy
when the offender’s activity is unambiguously harmful to society (as in the Becker
model).
Curry and Doyle (2016) extend the framework of Hylton (2005) in a formal model of law
enforcement that incorporates market transactions. 25 Importantly, Curry and Doyle show
22

Before Posner’s positive theory of criminal law, the only work providing a positive economic theory
(actually, utilitarian) of criminal law was the chapter on criminal law in Holmes (1881).
23
The market-bypass theory is a simple economic explanation for prohibiting theft. Other theories are
surprisingly complicated, see Hasen and McAdams (1997).
24
Specifically, Hylton (2005) presents a simplified version of the Becker optimization problem that
incorporates the option for the offender to purchase in the market rather than steal.
25
Philip A. Curry and Matthew Doyle, Integrating Market Alternatives Into the Economic Theory of
Optimal Deterrence, Economic Inquiry Vol. 54, No. 4, October 2016, 1873–1883.
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that maximization of a social welfare function in which offenders have the option to
transact through the market is equivalent to minimizing an objective function consisting
of the costs of crime. In particular, the cost-minimization objective function they derive
does not include the benefits that the offender receives from crime, which is quite
different from the objective function analyzed by Becker (1968). 26
Curry and Doyle do not recommend the complete deterrence approach as in Posner
(1985) and in Hylton (2005). The reason is that their model allows for the cost of
punishment to be positive. Given a positive cost of inflicting punishment, the incremental
deterrence gain from increasing the punishment must be balanced against the incremental
cost of imposing punishment. However, if the cost of punishment is negligible (as with
monetary fines) or slight relative to deterrence gain, as implicitly assumed in Posner and
in Hylton, then the complete deterrence penalties would also be recommended by Curry
and Doyle’s model.
The diagram below summarizes the modern synthesis suggested by Posner and developed
in Hylton (2005). In the first cell, the offender’s activity may be efficient. For example,
the harm may be an externality such as pollution, which is the byproduct of producing
some useful product. Transaction costs are high because it would be difficult for a large
number of pollution victims to enforce a right to clean air. The incentive to free ride
would make it unlikely that any single victim would sue to enjoin the polluter. In this
category, criminal law should adopt the internalization policy, because the underlying
activity is (at least potentially) efficient. Penalties should seek to internalize the social
harm from pollution rather than to completely deter the offender’s production activity.
In the second cell (upper right), the offender’s activity is unambiguously inefficient. The
activity could be some form of intentional imposition of harm, such as the production of
infant milk formula knowingly contaminated with a harmful chemical, such as
melamine. 27 Alternatively, the activity could be some form of reckless conduct, such as
driving in the wrong direction on highways. The optimal policy here is complete
deterrence, which requires a penalty that eliminates the prospect of gain on the part of the
offender.
In the lower-left cell, transaction costs are low and the underlying activity is efficient, at
least in some significant set of transactions. One set of examples includes temporary
takings of property to protect more valuable types of property. Consider, for example, a
mobile home seller who drives across the property of the victim, without the victim’s
permission, in order to avoid the burden of having to follow an alternative path that is
more time-consuming to travel (Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis.
26

That the benefits from crime to offenders are included in Becker’s social welfare function has been a
source of controversy (Stigler, 1970). Dau-Schmidt (1990) addresses the controversy by arguing that
criminal law serves in part to alter the preferences of offenders.
27
See, e.g., Gossner, 2009, at 1803 (A major food safety incident in China was made public in September
2008. Kidney and urinary tract effects, including kidney stones, affected about 300,000 Chinese infants and
young children, with six reported deaths. Melamine had been deliberately added at milk-collecting stations
to diluted raw milk ostensibly to boost its protein content.)
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1997)). Alternatively, suppose a wealthy person, to protect his Rolls Royce from damage
caused by bad weather, parks his car in the victim’s garage without getting the victim’s
permission. The optimal policy is again complete deterrence because the offender can
easily gain the consent of the victim for a transaction that imposes harm. The victim will
consent if the compensation offered by the injurer is at least as great as the harm.
The final cell includes activities for which the transaction costs are low, and are never
efficient. Most common law crimes such as murder fall within this cell. A consensual
transaction in which the victim accepts the harm in exchange for compensation is
unlikely, mostly because the injurer would be unable to offer a sufficient sum to fully
compensate the victim for the harm.

Deterrence Theory
Modern Synthesis

Maximum Offender Gain

High Transaction
Costs

Internalization of Harm

Complete Deterrence

(Liability Rule)

(Type 2 Property Rule)

Low Transaction
Costs

Complete Deterrence

Complete Deterrence

(Type 1 Property Rule)

(Type 1 Property Rule)

Greater than Minimum
Victim Harm

Maximum Offender Gain
Less than Minimum
Victim Harm

Table 2: Deterrence Policy Categories

As a positive theory of criminal law, this modern synthesis works well. Most crimes fall
under the three cells labeled “complete deterrence” in the diagram above. The
“internalization” cell captures transactions that fall under tort law generally. The tortcrime boundary is well explained by the boundary in the diagram between the first cell
and the remaining three cells.
Kaplow and Shavell (1996) show that this modern synthesis breaks down in a zero
transaction cost environment. If transaction costs are zero, then efficient transactions will
occur whether the underlying legal rule is a property rule (complete deterrence) or a
liability rule (internalization). This is an implication of the Coase Theorem. However,
9
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there are two reasons the modern synthesis remains valid in spite of the Kaplow-Shavell
proposition. First, zero-transaction cost environments are almost never realized. Some
sources of transaction costs, such as self-defense, are primitive, 28 in the sense that they
are hard-wired by evolution into human behavior. The existence of such primitive
transaction costs limits the Coase Theorem’s applicability. Second, even in the zerotransaction costs scenario, the seemingly efficient takings of property that would occur
under a liability rule would still fail the efficiency test in the longer term. 29 People make
investments in reliance on property rights and entitlements protected by law generally.
To the extent efficient takings deny individuals a profitable return on their investments,
such conduct would diminish society’s wealth in the long term.

Implications for Law

Substantive criminal law consists of doctrinal rules, such as the requirement of criminal
intent and defenses such as the necessity doctrine. These rules fit well within the
synthesis explained so far.

Criminal Intent

Consider the law on criminal intent. Under the framework elaborated here, intent doctrine
serves to distinguish cases where the complete deterrence policy is appropriate from
those where the internalization policy is appropriate. The complete deterrence policy is
appropriate where transaction costs are low and the offender has taken an action that
imposes a substantial harm on the victim, with the intention to impose the harm. Recall,
that I referred to this as a Type I Property Rule scenario. Complete deterrence is also
appropriate where the offender’s action are unambiguously socially undesirable, because
the burden of avoiding the harm is low and the harm is both easily foreseeable and great.
I referred to this as a Type 2 Property Rule scenario. Under these conditions, the
offender’s actions reveal an indifference to the victim’s welfare (again, take the case of
intentionally driving against the direction of highway traffic).
Criminal law doctrine requires something more of intent in the Type 1 scenario than does
tort law. Tort law requires only an intent to execute the act, while knowing with
substantial certainty that a harmful contact will occur (Hylton, 2016). Criminal law, on
the other hand, requires, in addition to this level of intent, evidence that the actor intended
to impose a substantial harm on the victim. A concrete illustration is Vosburg v. Putney
(50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891)), where the defendant kicked the plaintiff to get his attention
28
29

Hylton (2018b).
Id.

10
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while in school. The court found that the kick satisfied the level of intent required by tort
law, but also held that the evidence need not show an intention to impose a substantial
harm as would be required under criminal law. The slight kick given by Putney to
Vosburg was enough to satisfy the tort standard of intentionality but probably not enough
to satisfy the criminal law intent standard.
The tort law intent standard facilitates the optimal internalization of harm. 30 It guarantees
that tortfeasors will bear the costs of their intentional conduct, and therefore choose to
take an action that is potentially harmful (in the sense of being undesired) to another only
when the perceived private benefit of doing so is greater. The criminal law intent
standard, by contrast, ensures that courts apply the complete deterrence policy to the
appropriate instances. The complete deterrence policy requires a sanction sufficient to
remove the gain, and possibly greater. Such a policy would enable a court to impose a
sanction more severe than the level required for internalization of harm.
Regina v. Smith (David) (1 Q.B. 354 (1974)) illustrates the function of the intent standard
in criminal law. The defendant had installed electrical wiring, roofing, wall panels, and
floorboards in the apartment he rented, with the landlord’s permission. Under the law,
these minor additions became the property of the landlord. When the defendant decided
to leave the apartment he asked the landlord if his brother, who had been living with him,
could remain as the tenant. The landlord refused, and the defendant damaged the roofing,
wall panels, and floor boards in the course of taking out the electrical wiring he had
installed. The defendant argued as a justification that he thought he was damaging his
own property. A conviction by the trial court was overturned on appeal. The appellate
court held that the defendant’s actions did not indicate the type of intent to impose harm
required by criminal law. The defendant’s actions clearly revealed the type of intent
required by tort law, but not the type required by criminal law.
Certainly if the defendant in Regina v. Smith had walked into the landlord’s building and
damaged the roofing in an act of vandalism, the intent standard required by criminal law
would have been satisfied. In that case, the defendant would have imposed a substantial
harm with the intention to do so. In addition, the defendant would have had the option, in
this hypothetical scenario, to bargain with the landlord for the right to vandalize. Because
a harm would have been imposed, for the sole purpose of doing so, in a setting where the
actor could have arranged a consensual transaction, a Type 1 Property Rule violation
would have occurred. The court’s decision shows that courts distinguish the case of
imposition of harm with the pure intention to do so from instances where harm is
imposed in connection with some other, perhaps legitimate, motivation. These cases are
not Type 1 Property Rule violations because they lack the intention to harm. Because of
the absence of an intention to harm as the sole motivating factor the complete deterrence
policy should not apply. Although the defendant’s actions in Regina v. Smith violated tort

30

Hylton (2010).
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law, and would justify a judgment for damages in favor of the landlord, the actions
coupled with the intention would not justify criminal punishment.
The case for an insanity defense in criminal law, though not in tort law, follows directly
from this reasoning. Given that the intention to impose harm is an important element of
the Type 1 Property Rule violation, evidence that the defendant was insane would
undermine the inference that he had an intention to impose a substantial harm. 31 On the
other hand, the mere intention to execute the act leading to the harm would be sufficient
to justify the internalization policy effected through tort law. 32 Consequently, insanity is
not recognized as a defense in tort law, except in rare cases where the insanity prevents
the actor from meeting the basic intention-to-execute standard. 33
The self-defense justification also follows from the foregoing discussion. A person who
harms an assailant in self-defense clearly does not have the intent to harm required under
the criminal law, and necessary for triggering the complete deterrence policy. Surely, if
the defendant in Regina v. Smith did not have the intent required by criminal law, then an
individual who acts in self-defense does not meet the intent standard too. Of course, if the
person who acts in self-defense does so with excessive force, or in situations where there
is no reasonable basis for perceiving a need to act in self-defense, then the self-defense
justification is invalid. In all of these cases, the inference of intent to commit a Type 1
Property Rule violation follows from the acts committed by the defendant.
Regina v. Cunningham (2 Q.B. 396 (1957)) illustrates the function of the intent standard
in the Type 2 Property Rule context. The defendant went to the basement of 7A Bakes
Street, which was being rented by his prospective mother-in-law, though it was at the
time unoccupied, and tore the gas meter off the wall, causing coal gas to escape from the
connecting pipe. 7A Bakes Street was separated from the house next door in which the
victim lived only by a porous wall of loosely cemented rubble. The two houses had
originally been one. The gas seeped through the wall, nearly killing Mrs. Wade, the
tenant next door. The defendant claimed that he tore the meter off the wall to get money
from the meter. The court overturned the defendant’s conviction for reckless
endangerment because the jury had not been instructed to consider whether the defendant
had foreseen that removal of the meter might injure someone.
Conduct that is reckless under tort law is often reckless under criminal law as well.
However, courts should, under the economic framework, be more observant of the intent
requirement in the criminal law setting. Regina v. Cunningham indicates that the criminal
law requires strong evidence that the defendant acted with indifference toward the
welfare of the victim, which requires evidence of knowledge of the danger and of
knowledge of a foreseeable victim. The tort standard for recklessness is formally the
31
Posner (1985) justifies the insanity on the ground that insane actors are not deterrable. This approach is
over inclusive. Deterrability is not the sole basis for determining the scope of criminal law doctrines,
otherwise tort law would mirror criminal law.
32
Hylton (2016).
33
Id.
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same, though Cunningham suggests that criminal law courts are more demanding on
evidence supporting the inference of intent (indifference to harm).
The foregoing doctrines of criminal law are not entirely consistent with the theory that
intent is just an index of the probability of harm. 34 In Regina v. Smith, the harm to the
landlord may have been the same whether the defendant thought he was recapturing his
own property or not.

Necessity

The necessity defense in criminal (and in tort law) is an implication of this model. Under
the defense, a defendant may be excused if his actions imposed a harm in order to avoid a
much greater harm. These are cases where the costs of arranging a consensual transaction
are high, typically because of an emergency setting and because the victim would be
unlikely to give his consent anyway. In addition, the social gain from the defendant’s
conduct is positive. These two features put the necessity cases within the first cell of
Table 1, under the internalization policy.
United States v. Holmes (26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C. Penn. 1842)) illustrates the function (or
non-function) of criminal law in the necessity settings. After a shipwreck, Holmes, the
captain, and his crew found themselves in a lifeboat with surviving passengers. Finding
that the lifeboat was too small to carry the passengers and crew to safety, Holmes and his
crew decided to throw some passengers (unmarried males) off the boat to ensure the
safety of the remaining passengers. When the party made it to shore, Holmes was charged
with murder.
At first glance, the necessity defense would appear to be appropriate in Holmes. The
defendants were able to save a greater number of lives by jettisoning some passengers.
However, the court rejected the necessity defense because of the procedure that Holmes
had adopted in determining the unlucky passengers to jettison. The court held that
Holmes should have, to take advantage of the necessity defense, first determined the
minimum number of crew members necessary to maintain the lifeboat before turning
toward passengers to jettison, a procedure which Holmes had not followed. The
procedural rule required by the court is itself economically reasonable, because it would
dampen the moral hazard that would arise if ship captains could assume that passengers
would be sacrificed before crew.

34

An approach that starts with the optimal sanction and then works backward to determine whether
criminal law doctrines are consistent with the optimal sanction would suggest that intent is for the most part
an index of the probability of harm; see Holmes (1881), Becker (1968), Shavell (1985). This is an
appropriate starting point, but intent doctrine serves other functions as well.
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Holmes does not reject the principle of necessity. The decision merely limits the scope of
the defense in order to mitigate moral hazard that might generate more mass accidents in
which the sacrifice of some victims may be necessary to save a larger number of victims.

Public versus Private Enforcement

The choice between public and private enforcement of law is closely related to this
essay, 35 but it is largely a question of procedure rather than substance. The criminal law
consists of rules applying criminal sanctions to specific conduct. The determination of
whether law enforcement is carried out by the state exclusively or through the efforts of
private individuals is a different matter, and could be answered in any manner under the
same set of substantive law rules. Modern criminal law is a matter of public enforcement.
In the past, criminal law was privately enforced for the most part. 36
Comparative advantage explains most of the observed allocation of enforcement effort
between public and private actors. 37 Victims have an advantage in the ordinary cases of
knowing who the offender is. 38 For this reason, tort law is often sufficient as a law
enforcement mechanism. However, there are many scenarios where victims either do not
know who the offender is, or, knowing the offender, are unlikely to pursue an
enforcement action. Public enforcement is necessary in these cases.
The contribution of this model to the enforcement allocation question comes from its
derivation of a boundary between areas of complete deterrence and of internalization.
The state has an advantage over victims in carrying out the complete deterrence policy. 39
The state can credibly threaten to enjoin or to punish in instances where private
individuals could not. Enjoining or preventing the completion of a criminal act will often
require investigation and the collection of information. Few private individuals would
have an incentive to do so, especially given that the benefit of such effort would go
mainly to other potential victims. Moreover, the most harmful offenders would threaten
to retaliate against any private individual who attempted to enforce the law against them.
Few private individuals would risk their own safety to pursue an enforcement action
against an offender who threatens harm to the general public.
Conversely, private litigation has an advantage under the internalization policy. 40
Victims will often know the identity of the offender, and will especially have an
advantage in determining the harms they have suffered. Victims will be in the best

35

Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
See, e.g., Landes and Posner (1975, at 2), Grannuci (1969).
37
Steven Shavell (1993).
38
Id.
39
Hylton (2018a)
40
Id.
36
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position, relative to state actors, to inform courts of the harm, and to aid courts in
designing remedies that internalize the harm suffered by victims.

Public Choice

The public choice literature becomes relevant as soon as one examines the incentives of
actors under public enforcement. However, the public choice literature has important
implications for criminal procedure, more so than substantive criminal law (Hylton and
Khanna, 2007; Hylton 2018). The procedural implications matter for the deterrence
question.
The complete deterrence policy requires the elimination of any prospective gain from the
commission of an offense. There are many forms of punishment that could be used to
accomplish this purpose. The most common form today, imprisonment, would not
necessarily be the most obvious choice of punishment if society were to begin with a
clean slate. Incarceration provides an incapacitation benefit to society, by ensuring that
the criminal offender cannot offend again (at least against non-incarcerated people) while
in prison. The deterrence value of prison, however, is somewhat uncertain, given the
presumably heavy discounting of the future among the population of criminals.
Moreover, imprisonment is costly to society – both in the direct costs of maintaining the
incarcerated and in the indirect (opportunity) costs of their forgone labor.
The most plausible reason society bears such heavy costs in imprisoning convicted
criminals is that more efficient forms of punishment would generate greater rent seeking
in the enforcement process (Friedman, 1999). For example, a general property forfeiture
penalty would incentivize enforcers to pursue violations, both real and imagined, to
maximize the revenue to enforcers from forfeitures. The inefficient punishment system
that exists today appears to be suboptimal at first glance, but it would be difficult to
design a different punishment system that would not have substantial inefficiencies as
well.

Conclusion

Much of substantive criminal law can be justified using economic analysis. It appears to
be true that criminals are not easy to deter by the threat of punishment, probably because
many of them tend to discount the future heavily. At the same, however, there is a vast
population of non-criminals that includes many who are in fact deterred from harming
others by the criminal law. In any event, the focus on punishment is mostly of tangential
relevance in examining the economics of criminal law.
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Substantive criminal law consists of rules assigning criminal punishment to an assortment
of acts. The rules assign certain areas of offensive conduct to tort law and others to
criminal law, and within criminal law exempt some types of offensive conduct from
punishment. These assignments across tort and criminal law boundaries, and within
criminal law itself appear to be consistent with the aim of providing incentives to
minimize the costs of harm and harm avoidance. The moral injunction against harming
others fails to explain many of these patterns. Take, for example, the necessity defense,
which fits easily within an economic framework, but is unjustifiable on moral grounds.
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